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I.   INTRODUCTION 
 It is a commonly held position that a rule cannot be a legal rule 
unless the rule is binding; or to put it differently, that one element 
that distinguishes legal rules from other kinds of rules is that legal 
rules are regarded as binding by duly constituted officials—typically, 
courts—who are called upon to apply them.1 Thus in addressing the 
issue whether international law is law, H.L.A. Hart stated that 
“if . . . the rules of international law are not ‘binding,’ it is surely in-
defensible to take seriously their classifications as law; for however 
tolerant the modes of common speech may be, this is too great a dif-
ference to be overlooked.”2 Similarily, Joseph Raz draws a central 
distinction between “regulated” and “unregulated” disputes: a dis-
                                                                                                                    
 * Koret Professor of Law, University of California at Berkeley. A.B., Columbia Col-
lege, 1956; LL.B., Harvard Law School, 1959.  
 An earlier version of this Article was presented as the Mason Ladd Lecture at Florida 
State University College of Law in 1997. I thank Meier Dan-Cohen, Mark Greenberg, Kent 
Greenawalt, Ken Kress, Chris Kutz, and Robert Post for their exceptionally valuable com-
ments on earlier drafts of this Article, and Jon Eldan and Bhavna Daryanani for their very 
helpful work as research assistants. 
 1. Through this Article I use the term “rule” to include rules, principles, and stan-
dards. 
 2. H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 217 (2d ed. 1994). 
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pute is “regulated,” for Raz, if “the law is clear and cannot be 
changed by the judicial organ.”3 In regulated disputes, one particular 
solution is required by law; the court decides the case by applying 
preexisting and legally binding rules that it is under a duty to apply.4 
All other disputes are “unregulated.” 
 Similarly, it is an often-held position that the law consists of the 
rules of a jurisdiction that are duly enacted or adopted by officials 
who have the power to make rules that are binding in the jurisdic-
tion. So, for example, Raz states: “We find our law in statute books 
and law reports. . . . [L]aws . . . can be enacted or repealed by legisla-
tures and administrative authorities. They can also become legally 
binding through establishment by the courts.”5  
 The thesis of this Article is that both positions are incorrect. 
 To demonstrate that thesis I will begin, in Part II, by developing a 
concept that I call national law. The concept of national law is that 
there is a body of law in the United States that is made by officials 
across jurisdictions, legal scholars, and scholarly institutions, which 
constitutes law despite the fact that it is not binding in, and is not 
necessarily made by, officials of a deciding jurisdiction. Examples of 
national law are the rules that a donative promise is enforceable if 
relied upon, that an acceptance is effective on dispatch, and that the 
remedy for breach of a bargain contract is expectation damages. Na-
tional law is law because, as I will show, under the practice of the le-
gal profession, particularly the courts, the rules of national law (and 
not simply, or not at all, the reasons for those rules) are invoked as 
legal rules of decision. 
 Next, in Part III, I will consider certain aspects of the concept 
of the rule of recognition, formulated by H.L.A. Hart.6 Under that 
concept, a critical distinction is drawn between primary rules and 
secondary rules. Primary rules are rules of obligation that state 
how people are obligated to behave.7 Secondary rules are rules 
about establishing, changing, and applying primary rules. “They 
specify the ways in which the primary rules may be conclusively 
                                                                                                                    
 3. JOSEPH RAZ, THE AUTHORITY OF LAW 172 (1979).  
 4. Id. at 71, 90, 96, 181. 
 5. Joseph Raz, Legal Principles and the Limits of Law, 81 YALE L.J. 823, 825, 848 
(1972). There is a bit of dissonance within positivism, on this issue, concerning the status 
of custom as law. Raz takes the position that “[e]ven legal custom is not law until it is rec-
ognized and declared to be law by the courts.” RAZ, supra note 3, at 87. In contrast, H.L.A. 
Hart took the position that a custom could be law even before it was recognized as law by 
the courts, although he admitted that the kind of claim Raz makes may have “some plausi-
bility.” HART, supra note 2, at 44-48, 64. In any event, this dissonance is today marginal if 
not scholastic. Whether custom is law was chiefly salient in the matter of feudal tenures. 
The likelihood that the issue would arise in the context of a contemporary legal problem is 
highly remote in the United States, and probably in England as well. 
 6. HART, supra note 2, at 80-81, 94-95, 99, 107, 109. 
 7. Id. at 80-81. 
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ascertained, introduced, eliminated, varied, and the fact of their 
violation conclusively determined.”8 The most fundamental type of 
secondary rule is a rule of recognition. A rule of recognition is a 
rule that tells how to recognize that some other rule is a legal 
rule. As the rule of recognition is commonly understood, a given 
rule is a valid legal rule if but only if its pedigree can ultimately 
be traced to a source that is a source of law under a rule of recog-
nition.9 In contrast, a given rule is a rule of recognition if but only 
if it is accepted by the society, and perhaps more particularly by 
its officials. 
 In this Article I will take the concept of a rule of recognition as a 
postulate, and develop the following four principles concerning the 
meaning, application, and scope of that concept:  
 (1) The social group that must accept a secondary rule for the rule 
to constitute a rule of recognition is the legal profession, rather than 
simply judges and other officials.  
 (2) Whether the legal profession accepts a rule as a secondary rule 
of recognition can be determined by examining the kinds of primary 
rules that are invoked by the profession as legal rules in resolving le-
gal issues in general, and deciding cases in particular.  
 (3) A rule can be a legal rule even though it is not binding.  
 (4) In the United States, law is made not only by judges and other 
officials of the deciding jurisdiction but also by the national judiciary, 
legal scholars, and professional institutions (in particular, the 
American Law Institute). 
 These four principles and the concept of national law are separate 
but intimately related. They are separate because the concept of na-
tional law and the four principles can each stand on its own. They 
are intimately related because, on the one hand, the legal status of 
national law is one of its most important characteristics, while on the 
other hand, national law is a leading although not exclusive exem-
plar of the principles. Because the principles and the concept are in-
timately related, a complete account of each depends on the devel-
opment of the other. I will begin with the concept of national law, 
next turn to the principles, and finally link the concept and the prin-
ciples. 
                                                                                                                    
 8. Id. at 94. 
 9. See, e.g., RAZ, supra note 3, at 91 (stating that “the rule of recognition of a system 
constitutes its criterion of validity”). 
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II.   THE CONCEPT OF NATIONAL LAW 
A.   Local Law, Federal Law, and National Law 
 Under the concept of law that underlies some strands of positiv-
ism, American law consists of either the law of a state (including a 
subdivision of the state), which results from the promulgation of le-
gal rules by official organs (including judicial organs) of that state, or 
of federal law, which results from the promulgation of legal rules by 
official federal organs. I will refer to statements of rules in those two 
types of law as statements of local law and statements of federal law, 
respectively. 
 By statements of local law, I mean statements that take the ex-
press or implied form, “Based on authoritative sources, it is a rule of 
state S (or of a subdivision of a state, like a city or county) or of 
states S, T, and U, that R.” Examples include, “Under the law of New 
York, contracts require consideration,” and “Under the law of 
Pennsylvania, an acceptance is effective on dispatch.” By local law, I 
mean the body of rules of a given state that is described or set out in 
all such statements that are true. (I use the term local law, rather 
than state law, because the latter term is often used to refer to any 
substantive body of law that is not federal law—for example, the law 
of torts—rather than to the law of a particular state.) 
 By statements of federal law, I mean statements that take the ex-
press or implied form, “Based on authoritative sources, it is a rule of 
federal law that R.” Examples include, “A federal statute prohibits 
certain kinds of labeling on alcoholic beverages” and “Free speech is 
guaranteed under the U.S. Constitution.” By federal law, I mean the 
body of rules that is described or set out in all such statements that 
are true. 
 Local and federal law might seem to exhaust the categories of do-
mestic law in the United States. If, however, you walk into almost 
any law school in America, or read almost any leading American 
treatise or law review, you will find that many of the statements that 
are made of and about law are neither statements of federal law nor 
statements of local law. Rather, they are statements of and about law 
in general terms, divorced from particular jurisdictions. And these 
kinds of statements are not limited to the scholarly enterprise. Prac-
ticing lawyers will often talk in just this way. Perhaps more telling, 
bar examinations—the gateways to legal practice—are often cast in 
just this way. 
 A striking aspect of this kind of legal discourse is that it is so fun-
damental and so ingrained that those who use it are scarcely con-
scious, if they are conscious at all, that they are doing something that 
might seem relatively unusual from the perspective of prevailing le-
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gal theory. Like Molière’s bourgeois gentleman, who did not realize 
that he was speaking “prose,”10 the American legal community does 
not realize, or realizes in only a limited way, that its everyday dis-
course reflects an unspoken fundamental premise about law that is 
in need of exposition, explanation, and examination. 
 To begin with, then, it is necessary to name this mode of legal dis-
course, and the name I will give it is statements of national law. By 
statements of national law, I mean statements, made in the context 
of the American legal system, that expressly or impliedly take the 
form “Rule R is law” but are not expressly or impliedly statements 
that Rule R is federal or local law. Examples are “contracts require 
consideration” and “an acceptance is effective on dispatch,” where the 
speaker is not implicitly referring to the law of a given jurisdiction. 
By national law, I mean the body of rules described or set out in such 
statements that are established as legal rules in the national legal 
discourse. (I will expand on this definition in Part III.B.) 
 A significant portion of national law concerns common law areas, 
but national law and common law are not coextensive. Some common 
law areas may not be part of national law because the legal rules in 
the areas are highly localized. Conversely, even some areas that are 
basically statutory may be national law in part. This is most obvi-
ously the case where a common law rule has been widely codified (as 
in the case of the rule that only persons who were shareholders at 
the time of a wrong can bring derivative actions) or where a statutory 
rule has been ingrained in the law of virtually every state (as in the 
case of the Statute of Frauds). 
 In its purest form, a statement of national law may be unaccom-
panied by supporting citations to given jurisdictions. However, even 
a statement of a legal rule that is accompanied by such supporting ci-
tations may be a statement of national law, where the claim of the 
statement outruns the citations that could be mustered in its sup-
port. The claim in such a statement is categorical, like “death re-
vokes an offer,” but the actual citations will typically be limited to 
cases from only a limited number of jurisdictions, and even the pos-
sible citations will be limited to cases from less than all jurisdictions. 
Accordingly, even when such a statement is accompanied by citations 
to a number of jurisdictions, it is seldom if ever implied that every 
jurisdiction has adopted the rule. On the contrary, legal rules are 
commonly stated in categorical terms even though many jurisdictions 
have never ruled on the issue. The addressees of such statements are 
normally supposed to infer, not that the stated rule is the law only of 
the jurisdictions whose decisions are cited, but that it is a rule of na-
                                                                                                                    
 10. MOLIÈRE, THE BOURGEOIS GENTLEMAN act 2, sc. 4.  
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tional law that draws support from cases in the cited jurisdictions, 
among other things. 
 In fact, it is not even unusual for a rule to be categorically stated 
as law in sources that the legal profession views as authoritative al-
though the rule has been adopted only by the courts of a few jurisdic-
tions. To illustrate, there is a well-accepted rule of contract law that 
where an offer is made in a face-to-face or telephonic conversation, 
the offer lapses at the end of the conversation unless a contrary in-
tention is indicated. This rule was stated, for example, in Williston’s 
treatise when it was first published in the 1920s11 and in Corbin’s 
treatise when it was published in the l950s.12 It is stated as well in 
the Restatement (Second) of Contracts and in various modern trea-
tises, including the current versions of Williston and Corbin.13 As 
originally published, the Williston treatise cited just two cases in 
support of the rule.14 The Corbin treatise cited no cases at all. Even 
today, the two treatises, taken together, cite only three additional 
cases.15 Of the five total cited cases, some are not really on point, al-
though they contain dicta that support the rule. Those that are on 
point are ambiguous.16 Many other well-established rules of “contract 
law”—that is, national contract law—also have extremely limited 
support in relevant binding precedent. For example, Farnsworth 
points out that:  
Under the original draft of the first Restatement [of Contracts], as 
written by Williston and his advisers, the unknown death of the of-
                                                                                                                    
 11. 1 SAMUEL WILLISTON, THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 54, at 91 (1st ed. 1920).  
 12. 1 ARTHUR LINTON CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 36, at 150-51 (1950). 
 13. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 41(1) (1981); JOHN D. CALAMARI & 
JOSEPH M. PERILLO, CONTRACTS § 2-20, at 92-93 (3d ed. 1987); 1 ARTHUR LINTON CORBIN, 
CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 2.16 (Joseph M. Perillo ed., rev. ed. 1993); E. ALLAN 
FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS § 3.19, at 164 (3d ed. 1999); 1 SAMUEL WILLISTON, THE LAW OF 
CONTRACTS § 5:7, at 660 (Richard A. Lord ed., 4th ed. 1990). 
 14. WILLISTON, supra note 11, at 92 & n.33 (citing Mactier’s Adm’rs v. Frith, 6 Wend. 
103 (N.Y. 1830); Vincent v. Woodland Oil Co., 30 A. 991 (Pa. 1895)). 
 15. CORBIN, supra note 13, § 2.16 at 207 & n.7 (citing Akers v. J.B. Sedberry, Inc., 286 
S.W.2d 617 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1955)); WILLISTON, supra note 13, § 5:7, at 660 & n.1 (citing 
Wagenvoord Broad. Co. v. Canal Automatic Transmission Serv., Inc., 176 So. 2d 188 (La. 
Ct. App. 1965); Textron, Inc. v. Froelich, 302 A.2d 426 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1973); Akers, 286 
S.W.2d 617)). 
 16. For example, in Akers, the court held that an offer made in a conversation lapsed 
at the end of the conversation but added that in any event the offer had been rejected even 
before the conversation ended. Akers, 286 S.W.2d at 621-22. In Textron, a fabricator of 
steel and wire products orally offered a steel broker specified quantities of two different 
sizes of steel rods at specified prices. 302 A.2d at 427. The broker responded that he 
thought he wanted the rods but wished to check with his customers. Five weeks later, the 
broker called the fabricator and agreed to buy one size of rods at the price originally dis-
cussed; two days later, he agreed to purchase the other size, again at the earlier specified 
price. The broker refused to perform on the ground that no contract had been formed, and 
the fabricator brought suit. The Pennsylvania Superior Court strongly suggested that the 
conversation norm is only a rule of thumb. Id. 
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feror did not revoke [an] offer. But the Council of the American 
Law Institute changed the statement of the rule so that it does. 
Williston conceded, concluding that “though the amount of actual 
authority is not impressive, there is a very general opinion among 
lawyers that death, even though unknown, does revoke an offer 
and does revoke an agency.”17 
 In the balance of this Part, I consider some of the reasons why na-
tional law exists. I will return to that issue at the end of Part III. 
B.   The Economic Element 
 The economic reason for national law is straightforward: it often 
is economically desirable to have uniformity of law throughout the 
country, and national law is an instrument—often the best instru-
ment—for achieving that end. 
 I begin with a few definitions and distinctions, starting with the 
term uniformity of law. There are two different concepts of the uni-
formity of law: uniformity of legal rules, and uniformity of legal re-
sults. In this Article I will focus on uniformity of legal rules. For one 
thing, uniformity of legal rules is what is usually meant when we 
talk about the uniformity of law. For another, uniformity of legal 
rules achieves predictability and facilitates coordination in a way 
that uniformity of legal results does not. 
 Next, I distinguish between mandatory and nonmandatory unifi-
cation. By mandatory unification, I mean political processes by which 
different legal rules of separate jurisdictions are mandatorily re-
placed, or required to be replaced, by a uniform rule. One such proc-
ess is entry into a treaty under which a supranational authority is 
empowered to require national states to adopt uniform legal rules in 
certain areas. Another is the merger of sovereign states to form a 
new federal state in which some legal rules, the federal rules, will be 
mandatorily made uniform, although others, the state rules, will not. 
By nonmandatory unification, I mean political or social processes, 
other than mandatory unification, that lead to uniformity in the legal 
rules of separate jurisdictions. 
 In the United States, federal law normally originates as uniform 
law, in the form of constitutional, statutory, or administrative rules. 
Where conflicts develop in interpreting these rules, the Supreme 
Court has the power to unify the law, and commonly does so. 
 Unification of the local law of two or more states presents a more 
difficult problem. One mode of unifying a state-law area of law is to 
comprehensively federalize the area. From the perspective of the 
states, this mode involves mandatory unification. A second mode is 
                                                                                                                    
 17. FARNSWORTH, supra note 13, § 3.18 at 161. 
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state-by-state adoption of uniform acts. A third mode is the develop-
ment of national law. Both of the latter two modes involve nonman-
datory unification. 
 Federalization and the adoption of uniform acts have the advan-
tages and disadvantages associated with codification and special-
interest lobbying. Uniform acts also have the special disadvantage 
that they are often not universally adopted. Federalization has the 
special disadvantage that it tends to put a damper on local experi-
mentation.  
 In contrast, national law is a mode of achieving uniformity of law 
without special-interest lobbying, while avoiding codification and 
therefore preserving flexibility. This is not to say that national law is 
a better technique to achieve uniformity than federalization or the 
adoption of uniform acts, only that it may be better in a given case. 
In any event, the fact is that national law has been a fundamental 
mode of unification in the United States. Very important bodies of 
law, such as contracts, agency, and torts, have been made uniform ei-
ther in significant part or almost in whole largely through this mode. 
In those areas in which uniformity of law is desirable, and national 
law is a better instrument for achieving uniformity of law than uni-
form acts or federalization, national law serves an important eco-
nomic purpose. 
 However, although economics may be a reason for uniform law, it 
is not in itself sufficient. After all, it would also be economically ad-
vantageous to have uniform contract law throughout North America, 
but that has not occurred. It would be economically advantageous to 
have uniform contract law throughout Europe, but even today the 
realization of that objective is in a stage of infancy. 
 Perhaps most telling, in this regard, is the case of Louisiana. If 
economics alone drove uniform law for forty-nine states, surely it 
would also drive unification for the fiftieth. It has not. Louisiana was 
governed by either French or Spanish law from its early beginnings 
until the Louisiana Purchase.18 In 1804, the Territory of Orleans, 
later to become the State of Louisiana, was carved out of the Pur-
chase.19 Subsequently, the Territorial Legislature, after a vigorous 
battle with the Territory’s civil governor, adopted civil law as the law 
of the Territory.20 Eventually the Legislature adopted a Civil Code.21 
Shael Herman describes the present legal regime in Louisiana as fol-
lows: 
                                                                                                                    
 18. LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 171 (2d ed. 1985). 
 19. SHAEL HERMAN, THE LOUISIANA CIVIL CODE 29 (1993).  
 20. FRIEDMAN, supra note 18, at 172-73. 
 21. See id. at 174. 
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The Louisiana Civil Code, a one-volume blue-print for society, is 
among the most significant landmarks in American legal history. 
Inspired by the continental Roman tradition rather than by Eng-
lish law, the Civil Code makes Louisiana a unique American juris-
diction. Louisiana law, because it bears the imprint of Roman, 
Spanish, and French law, forces local lawyers to conceive legal is-
sues differently than their counterparts elsewhere in the United 
States . . . .  
 Civilians are proud of their scholarship, their intellectual culti-
vation, and their ability to read law in foreign languages. The Civil 
Code is the raison d’etre of civilian research. Civilians know 
French thinkers like Descartes and Rousseau as well as English 
philosophers like Locke and Hobbes. The doctrinal works of Jean 
Domat and Robert Pothier are as important for understanding the 
Civil Code as James Madison’s Federalist Papers are for the 
United States Constitution. 
 . . . Louisiana’s private law . . . today remains almost as different 
from the rest of American law as the metric system is from the 
English system of measurement.22 
 Therefore, as important as the economic element is in explaining 
the existence of national law, other institutional elements must also 
be at play. 
C.   Legal Scholarship 
 One of these institutional elements is the nature of American le-
gal scholarship. It is only a slight oversimplification to say that most 
prestigious legal scholars devote most of their domestic scholarship 
(that is, scholarship that does not involve comparative or interna-
tional law) to either pure theory, federal law, or national law.23 As a 
corollary, virtually all the nonfederal, non-pure-theory domestic legal 
scholarship that is widely admired, and widely familiar to scholars, 
judges, and practitioners, takes the form of national law. High-
prestige scholarship on legal subjects that are basically matters of 
nonfederal law, like contracts, torts, or agency, only seldom focuses 
on the law of individual states. 
 Why should this be so? One reason is that the American scholarly 
community tends to award recognition and prestige to theoretical 
and normative work, as opposed to descriptive and positive work. In 
principle, it may be as easy to do theoretical and normative analysis 
of local law as of national law. In practice, however, this tends not to 
be the case. Generally speaking, consumers of work on local law are 
interested primarily, and often almost exclusively, in descriptive and 
                                                                                                                    
 22. HERMAN, supra note 19, at 1-2.  
 23. My point here of course is not that local-law scholarship is either less worthy or 
less important than national-law scholarship, but only that for better or for worse as a so-
ciological matter it carries less prestige. 
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positive analysis. Typically, therefore, scholars who work on local law 
must pitch their scholarship in descriptive and positive terms if they 
are to have an audience. 
 Furthermore, as a practical matter it is often easier to analyze na-
tional law in theoretical and normative terms than to analyze local 
law in this manner. The spread of legal data points on the national 
landscape invites a creative integration of the points into a clear line. 
The process of creative integration, in turn, invites a theoretical and 
normative enterprise. The lesser number of data points in local law 
works in the opposite direction.24 Furthermore, once the prestige sys-
tem starts, it is self-perpetuating. Because recognition and prestige 
goes to scholars who work on pure theory, federal law, comparative 
law, international law, and national law, scholars who seek recogni-
tion and prestige will gravitate toward these fields rather than to lo-
cal law. 
 Even apart from issues of recognition and prestige, a scholar who 
wants to generalize and theorize, as most scholars do, will typically 
prefer national law over local law because national-law data provides 
a richer source for generalization and the construction of theories. 
 There is also an issue of audience. The audience for pure theory, 
federal law, and national law is nationwide. In contrast, the audience 
for local law is largely confined to the members of the legal commu-
nity of a single state and those members of the profession outside 
that state who happen to have an interest in the law of the state. Ac-
cordingly, even apart from the issue of recognition and prestige, 
scholars who believe they have something important to say, as most 
scholars do, will often prefer to write about national law rather than 
local law, because work in national law will allow them to address 
the widest possible audience. 
                                                                                                                    
 24. I do not deny that scholars can and do write about local law in a theoretical and 
normative way. For example, among the best treatises in the area of corporation law are 
the Marsh treatise on California law and the Balotti and Finkelstein treatise on Delaware 
corporation law. See generally R. FRANKLIN BALOTTI & JESSE A. FINKELSTEIN, THE 
DELAWARE LAW OF CORPORATIONS AND BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS (3d ed. 1997); HAROLD 
MARSH, MARSH’S CALIFORNIA CORPORATION LAW (4th ed. 2000). I often consult these trea-
tises to gain illumination into general issues of corporation law. I am pretty confident, 
however, that the vast majority of those who consult these treatises do not use them for 
general illumination, because their only interest is in the positive and descriptive discus-
sion in the treatises. 
 Furthermore, the special nature of these treatises may be partly a function of the special 
nature of Delaware and California corporation law. Delaware corporation law is virtually 
national corporation law. California is large, populous, and wealthy; it includes within its 
borders several great commercial centers and highly diverse forms of economic activity; 
and it has a number of intermediate courts of appeal that are not bound by each other’s de-
cisions. As a result, California offers a much richer source of legal data points than do most 
other states. 
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D.   Legal Education 
 Legal education is perhaps even more important than legal schol-
arship as a force for national law in the United States. In domestic-
law areas, all the leading law schools in the United States—and 
probably the bulk of all the law schools—offer substantive courses 
that exclusively, or almost exclusively, concern federal law, national 
law, international law, or pure theory. Correspondingly, all or virtu-
ally all leading domestic-law casebooks in the United States that are 
not federal-law casebooks are national-law casebooks. 
 These two elements—national-law courses and national-law case-
books—are related both to each other and to the elements that influ-
ence legal scholarship. Casebooks are a form of scholarship, and the 
factors that lead to writing national-law treatises, monographs, and 
articles also lead to writing national-law casebooks. Writing a case-
book oriented to local law would also severely restrict the market for 
the casebook. In addition, the leading law schools in the United 
States aspire to be, and hold themselves out to be, national schools 
with national student bodies. Teaching local law, which would be 
useful only in the state in which the law school was located, would be 
inconsistent with this aspiration. What is true of the leading law 
schools is true of most law schools, because most law schools consider 
themselves to be, aspire to be, or emulate leading law schools. 
 A telling aspect of the national-law character of American legal 
education is the irrelevance of the state in which a legal academic 
has received her legal education and passed the bar. If the Dean of, 
say, the University of Michigan Law School was asked whether a 
candidate for the Michigan faculty was disqualified for an appoint-
ment because she had been educated at Columbia Law School and 
had been admitted to practice only in New York, the Dean would 
think that the questioner must be from another country, if not an-
other planet. 
E.   Bar Examinations 
 Just as legal scholarship and legal education focus on national 
law, so too do the bar examinations of most states, in whole or in 
part. The significant national-law orientation of state bar examina-
tions reinforces the importance of national law. It also provides sup-
port to teaching national law, because it relieves law schools from 
some or all of the pressure to teach local law that could exist if the 
bar examinations were exclusively oriented to local law.  
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F.   Legal History 
 Another critical element in the development of American national 
law lies in American legal history. Generally speaking, English 
common law was officially or unofficially made the law of the early 
states. Speaking of the period up to the beginning of the nineteenth 
century, Lawrence Friedman has said: 
As a practical matter, English law continued to be used by lawyers 
and courts, throughout the period, throughout the country. Eng-
land remained the basic source of all law that was not strictly new 
or strictly American. The habits of a lifetime were not easily 
thrown over . . . . Indigenous legal literature was weak and deriva-
tive. There was no general habit of publishing American decisions; 
American case reports were not common until a generation or 
more after Independence. To common-law lawyers, a shortage of 
cases was crippling. To fill the gap, English materials were used, 
English reports cited, English judges quoted as authority. In the 
first generation, more English than American cases were cited in 
American reports. Ordinary lawyers referred to Blackstone con-
stantly; they used his book as a shortcut to the law; and Black-
stone was English to the core.25 
 With the exception of Louisiana, the later states followed the early 
states, one way or another. Arthur Rosett has pointed out that 
“[m]any western states were devoid of elaborate legal systems until 
English law arrived with the first pioneers. [Indeed,] Spanish law 
was shoved aside in the southwest and California despite treaty obli-
gations to respect it.”26 
 This common origin of American state law has three kinds of ef-
fects. First, state-law doctrines were all born of the same parent con-
cepts, and to the extent that different states developed different doc-
trines, the doctrines are more likely to resemble fraternal twins than 
members of different families. Second, Americans were trained from 
the beginning to think that they had a national law—that is, at the 
beginning, English law. Third, as a result of this history, together 
with their subsequent legal education, American lawyers have a 
common vocabulary and a common doctrinal base. 
 The significance of history is brought home by the experience in 
Louisiana, whose early law was based on civil rather than English 
law, and whose law even today remains outside the boundaries of na-
tional law. 
                                                                                                                    
 25. FRIEDMAN, supra note 18, at 112. 
 26. Arthur Rosett, Unification, Harmonization, Restatement, Codification, and Re-
form in International Commercial Law, 40 AM. J. COMP. LAW 683, 695 (1992); see also 
FRIEDMAN, supra note 18, at 167-72. 
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 Another body of law that is historically relevant to national law is 
one that is now almost forgotten: the “general law” of the early nine-
teenth century. Willy Fletcher has recaptured this almost forgotten 
body of law: 
A modern reader may find it hard to understand the concept of 
general law employed by early nineteenth century lawyers and 
judges. The underlying premise was that the general law was not 
attached to any particular sovereign; rather, it existed by common 
practice and consent among a number of sovereigns. The group of 
relevant participants in the law-making and law-determining 
process varied depending on the category of general law at is-
sue. . . . The American courts resorted to this general body of pre-
existing law to provide the rules of decision in particular cases 
without insisting that the law be attached to any particular sover-
eign. 
 . . . . 
 During the first part of the nineteenth century, the federal 
courts often used . . . general law to supply the rule of decision. It 
was applied in a wide variety of cases, but most frequently and 
consistently in commercial cases. As an article of faith, and as a 
matter of substantial truth, jurisprudential writers from the mid-
dle of the eighteenth through the early nineteenth century reiter-
ated that commercial transactions in all civilized trading countries 
were governed by a uniform set of commercial laws . . . . 
 The concept of a uniform law merchant was quite naturally im-
ported into the treatment of commercial law by American courts. 
Justice James Wilson, in his Lectures on Law delivered in 1790 
and 1791 in Philadelphia, referred to the law merchant as having 
“been admitted to decide controversies concerning bills of ex-
change, policies of insurance, and other mercantile transactions, 
both where citizens of different states, and where citizens of the 
same state only, have been interested in the event.” . . . Zephaniah 
Swift, justice and later chief justice of the Connecticut Supreme 
Court, wrote in his 1810 digest of the law of evidence and treatise 
on negotiable instruments, “In questions of commercial law, the 
decisions of Courts, in all civilized, and commercial nations, are to 
be regarded, for the purpose of establishing uniform principles in 
the commercial world.” . . . 
 . . . . 
 The sense of adhering to and applying a “universal law” of com-
mercial transactions persisted, to some degree, throughout the 
first half of the nineteenth century; but as early as 1810, it began 
to be supplanted by the notion of a uniquely American common 
law. By the 1820’s, a new pride in American law had emerged and 
American lawyers began to speak fairly regularly of a distinctly 
American law merchant, different in significant respects from the 
international law merchant. 
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 This modified law merchant was still regarded as a general 
American common law rather than as the local law of any particu-
lar state. . . .27 
 The long reign of general law, which undoubtedly drew in part 
from the older American habit of following English law, reinforced 
the American norm that legal rules did not have to be either local or 
federal. And although general law itself withered away under the in-
fluence of Erie v. Tomkins,28 historically it served as a kind of tem-
plate for national law, which is in some important ways its successor. 
G.   Aspirations 
 National law is also the product of a cultural aspiration to be an 
American nation with an American culture and an American law. 
The Louisiana experience tells much about the importance that a 
culture places on its law. When the Governor of the Territory that 
later became Louisiana attempted to force the Territory to adopt 
common law, the citizens of the Territory saw this attempt as a 
threat to the fundamental nature of their culture. In a manifesto, 
the President of the Territory’s legislative council and other legisla-
tors protested: 
We certainly do not attempt to draw any parallel between the civil 
law and the common law; but, in short, the wisdom of the civil law 
is recognized by all Europe; and this law is the one which nine-
teen-twentieths of the population of Louisiana know and are ac-
customed to from childhood, of which they would not see them-
selves deprived without falling into despair. If the inhabitants of 
this Territory had never known any laws, if they had lived down to 
the present time without making agreements or contracts, it would 
perhaps be a matter of indifference to them whether to adopt one 
system or another system, and it is even probable that their at-
tachment to their new mother country would cause them to prefer 
that system which would bring them nearest to their new fellow-
citizens. But it is a question here of overthrowing received and 
generally known usages, and the uncertainty with which they 
would be replaced would be as unjust as disheartening.29 
 Just as the citizens of the Territory that became Louisiana 
wanted a law that reflected their outlook on the world, so do the citi-
zens of America as a whole. In the long run, legal rules can only be 
justified by propositions of morality, policy, and experience. It is true 
                                                                                                                    
 27. William A. Fletcher, The General Common Law and Section 34 of the Judiciary 
Act of 1789: The Example of Marine Insurance, 97 HARV. L. REV. 1513, 1517-20 (1984) 
(footnotes omitted).  
 28. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).  
 29. Manifesto of Legislative Council of Territory of Orleans (1806), reprinted in 
HERMAN, supra note 19, at 29-30.  
2002]                         CONCEPT OF NATIONAL LAW 1243 
 
that a person or an official may be justified in following or adhering 
to a legal rule, without regard to such propositions, on the basis of 
the source of the rule; but what counts as a justification for following 
or adhering to a rule is different from what counts as a justification 
of the rule itself. Thus if there is a legal rule that a simple unrelied-
upon donative promise is unenforceable, and a promisee brings suit 
on such a promise, a court could justify holding for the promisor on 
the ground that this result was required by the established rule. 
However, that justification of the court’s decision would do nothing to 
show that the rule was itself justified. Similarly, if the Statute of 
Frauds is in effect in a given jurisdiction, and a promisee brings suit 
on an oral contract for the sale of land, a court could justify holding 
for the promisor on the ground that the Statute of Frauds barred the 
suit. Again, however, that justification of the court’s decision would 
do nothing to show that the Statute of Frauds was itself justified. 
The rules concerning the unenforceability of simple unrelied-upon 
donative promises and oral contracts for the sale of land can be justi-
fied, if at all, only on the basis of morality, policy, and experience. 
 In the common law areas that form the great bulk of national 
law, the ultimate justifications of legal rules normally must be found 
in social morality and social policy. Social morality and social policy 
vary locally to a certain extent, but at least in the areas that are the 
subject of national law, they tend to be American rather than local. 
The concept that otherwise-equivalent transactions can properly be 
given different treatment simply because they occur on different 
sides of a state boundary is only infrequently supported in the pre-
sent day. We are, after all, one country. 
III.   FOUR PRINCIPLES CONCERNING THE CONCEPT OF THE RULE  
OF RECOGNITION  
 To recapitulate, there are a number of rules in the United States 
that are not binding and are not promulgated by official organs of a 
relevant jurisdiction, but which are generally accepted as legal 
rules. I call the body of these rules national law. When law school 
teachers teach domestic nonfederal law, they commonly or indeed 
usually teach national law. When legal scholars write about domes-
tic nonfederal law, they commonly or indeed usually write about na-
tional law. For example, when we teach that a contract requires 
consideration, we view ourselves as teaching law. When we write 
that a contract requires consideration, we view ourselves as describ-
ing law. It might be argued that such a statement is shorthand for 
the proposition that a contract requires consideration under the law 
of most states, but as I will show below these statements are state-
ments of law and are so intended. When a legal scholar teaches or 
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writes that a contract requires consideration, he does not mean that 
he has checked the law of every state, or even that he relies on some 
scholar who has checked the law of every state. He means just what 
he says: that under the law of contracts—that is, the national law of 
contracts—a contract requires consideration. (Indeed, as shown in 
Part I, there are many cases where a categorical statement of a legal 
rule could not possibly mean that the rule has been adopted by 
every state, because many states will not have passed upon the is-
sue.) Similarly, when bar examiners test applicants for admission to 
the bar on national law, they view themselves as giving a law ex-
amination. 
 But the question arises, to borrow H.L.A. Hart’s characterization 
of criticism of the concept that international law is law, “We know 
that it is called law, but is it really law?”30 
 There are, of course, important competing concepts of what consti-
tutes law. As discussed in Part I, in The Concept of Law, H.L.A. Hart 
developed the concept of the rule of recognition. Hart began with the 
thesis that a legal system consists of “a union of primary and secon-
dary rules.”31 Primary rules are rules of obligation that state how 
people are obligated to behave.32 Secondary rules are rules about es-
tablishing, changing, and applying primary rules. The most funda-
mental type of secondary rule is a rule of recognition. A rule of recog-
nition is a rule that tells how to recognize that some other rule is a 
legal rule. It specifies “some feature or features possession of which 
by a suggested rule is taken as a conclusive affirmative indication 
that it is” a legal rule.33 It is a rule “for conclusive identification of 
the primary rules of obligation.”34 “To say that a given rule is valid is 
to recognize it as passing all the tests provided by the rule of recogni-
tion . . . .”35 Thus a given rule is a valid legal rule if its pedigree can 
ultimately be traced to a source that is a source of law under a rule of 
recognition. In contrast, a given rule is a rule of recognition if but 
only if it is accepted by a relevant social group. (In reality, a rule of 
recognition will almost invariably consist of a cluster of rules. I will 
follow general usage by referring to such a cluster as if it were a sin-
gle rule.) 
 A much different concept, developed by Dworkin, treats as law 
those principles that satisfy some designated standard of fit with 
                                                                                                                    
 30. HART, supra note 2, at 215. 
 31. Id. at 79. 
 32. Id. at 80-81. 
 33. Id. at 94. 
 34. Id. at 95. 
 35. Id. at 103. Two other types of secondary rules are rules of change and rules of ad-
judication. A rule of change empowers an official to introduce new primary rules and to 
eliminate old ones. Id. at 95. A rule of adjudication empowers an official to determine au-
thoritatively whether a primary rule has been broken. Id. at 97. 
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prior institutional decisions and best justify those decisions as a co-
herent whole in terms of political morality. For example, in Law’s 
Empire, Dworkin states that “propositions of law are true if they fig-
ure in or follow from the principles of justice, fairness, and proce-
dural due process that provide the best constructive interpretation of 
the community’s legal practice . . . .” 36 
 Another concept of law, which I develop in The Nature of the 
Common Law,37 is that the law consists of the rules that would be 
generated at the present moment by application of the institutional 
principles of adjudication. I call this the generative concept. Under 
this concept, to determine the content of the law, courts and lawyers 
do not begin with doctrinal propositions and work backward to de-
termine their validity, as they do under the concept of the rule of rec-
ognition. Rather, they begin with a set of institutional principles and 
work forward to generate legal rules. These institutional principles 
instruct the courts that in determining the law they should take ac-
count not only of doctrinal propositions promulgated by officials of 
the relevant jurisdiction, but also of the criticism and understanding 
of those propositions expressed in the professional discourse, doc-
trinal propositions established in the professional literature, and ap-
plicable social propositions. The rules generated by the interplay 
among those propositions under the institutional principles of adju-
dication are law. 
 For purposes of this Article, I will not argue for one of these con-
cepts, but instead will take the concept of a rule of recognition as a 
postulate, partly because it is the most widely accepted concept of 
law; partly because, as Hart himself stressed, the rule of recognition 
is not a definition of law;38 and partly because important issues re-
main concerning the meaning and application of the concept, some of 
which are illuminated by the concept of national law. I will address 
                                                                                                                    
 36. RONALD DWORKIN, LAW ’ S  EMPIRE 225, 226, 240 (1986). 
 37. MELVIN A. EISENBERG, THE NATURE OF COMMON LAW 154, 156 (1988). 
 38. For example, Hart said:  
[T]hough the combination of primary and secondary rules merits, because it 
explains many aspects of law, the central place assigned to it, this cannot by it-
self illuminate every problem. The union of primary and secondary rules is at 
the centre of a legal system; but it is not the whole, and as we move away from 
the centre we shall have to accommodate . . . elements of a different character. 
 . . . .  
 Though the idea of the union of primary and secondary rules has . . . virtues, 
and though it would accord with usage to treat the existence of this character-
istic union of rules as a sufficient condition for the application of the expression 
‘legal system’, we have not claimed that the word ‘law’ must be defined in its 
terms. It is because we make no such claim to identify or regulate in this way 
the use of words like ‘law’ or ‘legal’, that this book is offered as an elucidation of 
the concept of law, rather than a definition of ‘law’ which might naturally be 
expected to provide a rule or rules for the use of these expressions. 
HART, supra note 2, at 99, 213. 
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four such issues: (1) What social group must accept a secondary rule 
for it to constitute a rule of recognition? (2) How is it determined 
whether a rule has been accepted as a rule of recognition by the rele-
vant social group? (3) Who are the lawmakers under the American 
rule of recognition? (4) Does the concept of the rule of recognition re-
quire that a rule be binding if it is to constitute a primary legal rule? 
A.   The Social Group That Must Accept a Secondary Rule for 
the Rule to Constitute a Rule of Recognition is the Legal Profession, 
Rather Than Simply Judges and Other Officials 
 If a secondary rule is to constitute a rule of recognition, it must be 
accepted by some social group. But what social group? Hart himself 
was somewhat ambiguous concerning just who must accept a rule if 
it is to constitute a rule of recognition. At some points he spoke about 
“the practice of judges, officials, and others,”39 or about the presuppo-
sitions that lie behind “[s]tatements of legal validity made about par-
ticular rules in the day-to-day life of a legal system whether by 
judges, lawyers, or ordinary citizens.”40 At other points, however, he 
spoke only of the acceptance of the rule of recognition by “officials,”41 
or as a rule of recognition as “existing only if it is accepted and prac-
tised in the law-identifying and law-applying operations of the 
courts.”42 
 Hart’s views on this issue were either too broad or too narrow. At 
least in the United States, the relevant social group is neither society 
as a whole, on the one hand, nor judges and other officials, on the 
other. Instead, the relevant social group is the legal profession—that 
is, practicing lawyers (including government lawyers, such as attor-
neys general), legal academics, and especially, but not exclusively, 
the judiciary. 
 This approach is less inclusive than one in which the only social 
group whose acceptance counts is the society as a whole. A rule of 
recognition will not have requisite acceptance if it is actively rejected 
by the society as a whole. For the most part, however, the society as a 
whole is neither informed nor interested in what kinds of rules are 
legal rules, except in the most generalized way. 
 On the other hand, an approach that centers on the views of the 
legal profession is more inclusive than one in which the only social 
group whose acceptance counts is judges and other officials. Cer-
tainly acceptance of a rule of recognition by the judiciary is especially 
important, but judges are members of and participants in the wider 
                                                                                                                    
 39. Id. at 109. 
 40. Id. at 108. 
 41. Id. at 117. 
 42. Id. at 256. On Hart’s ambiguity concerning this issue, see RAZ, supra note 3, at 92. 
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legal culture, and form and reform their views of law as participants 
in that culture. Furthermore, if judges became seriously out of step 
with the general legal culture in regard to a rule of recognition, it is 
doubtful that the rule would long continue to have the requisite ac-
ceptance. Indeed, the integrity of the legal system would be seriously 
threatened if the judiciary were drastically out of step with the bar 
and legal academics concerning what constituted a legal rule. If that 
were to occur, the judiciary would be held in contempt by the very 
groups to whom they are most accountable. Moreover, at least in the 
United States, judges are, with rare exceptions, trained as practicing 
lawyers before assuming the bench, and it would be highly surprising 
if the views of law impressed on lawyers in their legal education and 
early careers were to be suddenly dropped when the lawyers put on 
robes. Finally, for most practical purposes the law is what practicing 
lawyers say it is; that is, to the extent that private or public actors 
plan or act on the basis of law, they will normally plan or act on the 
basis of what their lawyers tell them is the law. Accordingly, the 
views of practicing lawyers concerning what kinds of rules count as 
legal rules in rendering such opinions are of vital importance.  
B.   Whether the Legal Profession Accepts a Secondary Rule as a Rule  
of Recognition Can Be Determined By Examining the Kinds  
of Primary Rules That Are Invoked by the Profession as Legal Rules  
in Resolving Legal Issues in General, and Deciding Cases  
in Particular 
 Assuming the validity of the concept of the rule of recognition, 
how is it determined what kinds of rules constitute legal rules? To 
put this differently, how is the content of the rule of recognition de-
termined? One method is to listen to what the profession says. A sec-
ond method is to watch what the profession does. Under the second 
method, we begin by examining the kinds of primary rules that are 
invoked as legal rules by the legal profession in resolving legal issues 
in general, and deciding cases in particular, and then infer, from the 
invocation of those kinds of rules in that way, that the view of the 
profession is that under the rule of recognition such rules are legal 
rules. 
 That is a summary statement of a principle that I will call the 
“Invocation Principle.” In the balance of this section, I will expand on 
this summary statement.  
 In full, the Invocation Principle has two parts. 
 The first part of the Principle is that any class of rules constitute 
legal rules if rules in that class are viewed as legal rules by the legal 
profession—practicing lawyers, legal academics, and especially, but 
not exclusively, the judiciary. The reason is simple. Once it is ac-
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cepted that a rule is a rule of recognition if it is viewed as such by the 
legal profession, then we must follow views of the profession in this 
regard wherever those views take us. Accordingly: (1) Any class of 
rules that are legal rules in the view of the legal profession are legal 
rules. (2) Such a class may be defined by any convention that the pro-
fession accepts at any given time. (3) Any such convention is or be-
comes part of the rule of recognition. 
 The second part of the Principle addresses the question, what is 
the operational test for whether rules in a given class are viewed as 
legal rules by the profession? The answer to that question is also 
simple: the test is whether in the view of the profession, and particu-
larly the judiciary, it is proper to invoke rules in that class as legal 
rules, by which I mean to invoke rules in that class as legal rules of 
decision. Under the second part of the Principle, whether a given 
class of rules qualify as legal rules under the Principle is normally 
determined objectively, by observing the practice of the profession, 
and in particular the practice of the judiciary, to determine whether 
the profession, particularly the judiciary, invokes rules in that class 
as legal rules. However, although the legal status of the class of rules 
is determined objectively, by observing the practice, application of 
the Invocation Principle ultimately rests on the internal point of view 
that Hart made central—that is, on whether, in the internal view of 
the profession, particularly the judiciary, it is proper to invoke a 
class of rules as legal rules.43  
 We can infer the view of the profession on this question from two 
kinds of evidence. The first kind of evidence is a practice itself: in the 
absence of strong facts to the contrary, it is fair to infer that if mem-
bers of the profession, especially judges, routinely follow a practice, 
they believe the practice is proper. The second kind of evidence is 
criticism, or more particularly the absence of criticism, in the litera-
ture of the legal culture—cases, law review articles, treatises, and 
the like. If the profession generally follows a practice of invoking a 
certain class of rules as legal rules, and there is no substantial criti-
cism of the practice within the literature of the legal culture, it is fair 
to infer that the internal view of the profession is that the practice is 
proper. 
 To fully explicate the operation of the Invocation Principle, it is 
necessary to distinguish between doctrinal propositions and social 
propositions. By doctrinal propositions, I mean propositions that 
purport to state legal rules and are found in or can be derived from 
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sources that are generally regarded by the legal profession as expres-
sions of legal doctrine. One group of doctrinal sources consists of offi-
cial texts that are regarded as binding on a deciding court, such as 
constitutions, statutes, and certain kinds of precedents. A second 
group of doctrinal sources consists of texts that are promulgated by 
officials but are not binding on a deciding court, such as precedents 
in other jurisdictions and statutes that are applicable only by anal-
ogy. A third group of doctrinal sources consists of texts on the law 
authored by members and students of the profession, such as Re-
statements, treatises, and law reviews. I will refer to the second and 
third groups of doctrinal sources, taken together, as the national lit-
erature. It is in this literature that national law is to be found. 
 By social propositions, I mean all propositions other than doc-
trinal propositions. The types of social propositions most salient to 
modern Western law are moral norms, policies, and empirical propo-
sitions (such as propositions that describe the way in which people 
behave and institutions operate). In the balance of this Article, when 
I refer to social propositions I mean social propositions that are le-
gally relevant and meritorious and that can properly be taken into 
account by a lawmaker. 
 For purposes of the Invocation Principle, the crucial difference be-
tween doctrinal and social propositions is that social propositions are 
invoked as reasons for legal rules, while doctrinal propositions are 
invoked as legal rules. So, for example, in the area of donative prom-
ises, one or more social propositions may be invoked to show why 
simple unrelied-upon donative promises should be legally unenforce-
able, while a doctrinal proposition is invoked to show that simple un-
relied-upon donative promises are legally unenforceable. More gen-
erally, doctrinal propositions must be invoked to resolve legal issues 
and decide cases. In contrast, social propositions can never in them-
selves be utilized to decide cases or resolve other legal issues, unless 
they are either made into doctrines or made the basis of doctrines. 
For example, the moral proposition that promises should be kept 
cannot be invoked, as such, to decide a case. However, a court could 
determine that this moral proposition will be converted into the doc-
trinal proposition that all promises are legally enforceable, which 
will decide both the case at hand and all future cases to which the 
doctrine was applicable. Or, a court could determine that the moral 
proposition, when combined with policy propositions, will serve as 
the basis for a doctrinal proposition that certain kinds of promises 
are legally enforceable.  
 Accordingly, while social propositions cannot meaningfully be util-
ized to resolve legal issues and decide cases except in conjunction 
with doctrinal propositions that they justify, doctrinal propositions 
can be invoked to resolve legal issues and decide cases without invok-
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ing or even adverting to the social propositions that justify the doc-
trinal propositions. Indeed, it is just the fact that a proposition is 
properly invoked as a legal rule, rather than as a social reason for a 
rule, that marks out the proposition as a legal rule under the Invoca-
tion Principle. 
 National-law rules are legal rules because they are invoked in just 
this way. The doctrinal propositions that comprise national law are 
not invoked as reasons for legal rules; they are invoked as legal 
rules.44 So, for example, a court faced with a relied-upon donative 
promise may—indeed, is highly likely to—invoke the rule of the Re-
statement of Contracts that a relied-upon donative promise is en-
forceable as a rule of decision, without invoking the social proposi-
tions for the rule, and then apply that rule to the facts at hand to de-
cide the case before it. The practice of the profession, and particu-
larly the courts, in invoking rules of national law as legal rules of de-
cision, just because they are rules of national law, is what makes na-
tional-law rules legal rules. As a result, when there is a national-law 
rule, then in the absence of a local binding precedent the national-
law rule will often be treated in virtually the same way as such a 
precedent. For example, if there is no local binding precedent govern-
ing whether an acceptance that crosses with a revocation is effective 
on dispatch or on receipt, and the dispatch rule is established as na-
tional law, a court will typically invoke that rule in the same way as 
if the rule had been established in a local precedent. Indeed, na-
tional-law rules will often be invoked as law even if they lead to a re-
sult different from that established in local precedent, at least if the 
national-law rule is not wholly inconsistent with the precedent. Thus 
if a precedent of a state has established the rule that a donative 
promise is unenforceable, the courts of the state will nevertheless 
characteristically invoke the national-law rule that a donative prom-
ise is enforceable if relied upon. If a precedent of a state has estab-
lished the rule that a firm offer is revocable, the courts of the state 
will nevertheless characteristically invoke the national-law rule that 
a firm offer is enforceable if relied upon. If a precedent of a state has 
established the rule that performance of a legal duty is not consid-
eration, the courts of the state will nevertheless characteristically in-
voke the national-law rule that a promise to perform a legal duty is a 
                                                                                                                    
 44. See John Henry Merryman, The Authority of Authority: What the California Su-
preme Court Cited in 1950, 6 STAN. L. REV. 613, 620 (1954): 
[S]econdary authorities . . . can and do play a part in the total process which is 
not greatly different from that played by primary materials. It is possible for 
cases to be decided, rules of law to be stated, lines of decision begun and per-
petuated, solely on the authority of a textual treatment having its origins out-
side the judicial or legislative process. . . . [U]ltimately it becomes impossible to 
draw clear distinctions between primary and secondary authority except in 
terms of origin. 
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consideration if the promise is part of a fair and equitable modifica-
tion of the contract that gave rise to the legal duty.  
 Illustrations of the way in which national-law rules are invoked 
by the courts as legal rules of decision can be found in any state or 
regional reporter. I will give two examples here: Thieme v. Worst 45 
and Renner v. Kehl.46 Both Thieme and Renner are state-law cases 
that involve issues of mistake in contract law. In each case, the court 
decided the issues solely by invoking national-law rules, without in-
voking either local law or the reasons for the national-law rules. 
 In Thieme v. Worst,47 the Thiemes purchased a tract of land from 
the Worsts. Ownership of the tract carried seven shares of water. 
The availability of these shares was an important consideration for 
the Thiemes, who intended to pasture animals and grow a garden. 
The tract had a system of water-delivery ditches in its southeast cor-
ner, and the Thiemes believed that the seven water shares were 
available through those ditches. The Worsts apparently believed the 
same thing.  
 It turned out that this belief was mistaken, because there was no 
system to conduct water to the ditches in the southeast corner. The 
Thiemes sued the Worsts for rescission and damages. The trial court 
found that the doctrine of mutual mistake applied to the transac-
tion.48 Rather than granting the usual remedy of rescission, however, 
the trial court modified the contract to require the Worsts to provide 
a system that would deliver water to the southeast corner.49 The 
Thiemes wanted rescission, and appealed. The Idaho Court of Ap-
peals affirmed, relying entirely on national law. 
 The court began with the issue whether the doctrine of mutual 
mistake was applicable, and invoked national law to show that it 
was: 
The trial court found that the Thiemes would not have entered 
into the contract had they been aware of the water difficulties. 
Also, there was evidence showing that, during negotiations con-
ducted through the brokers, Richard Worst rejected one offer made 
by the Thiemes and held out for a higher figure, contending that 
the water shares were worth the difference. Thus, we uphold the 
district judge’s ruling that there was a mutual mistake. Both 
parties were mistaken “at the time [the] contract was made as 
to a basic assumption on which the contract was made. . . .” 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 152 (1979) (hereinafter 
cited as Restatement). 
                                                                                                                    
 45. 745 P.2d 1076 (Idaho Ct. App. 1987).  
 46. 722 P.2d 262 (Ariz. 1986).  
 47. 745 P.2d at 1077-78. 
 48. Id. at 1079.  
 49. Id. at 1080.  
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  . . . [T]he Thiemes’ view of the property would logically confirm 
their belief that seven shares of water were deliverable through an 
existing irrigation system. We are not persuaded that the Thiemes 
should bear the risk of the mistake under the rule stated in § 154 
of the Restatement. . . .50 
 The court then turned to the issue of remedy and again invoked 
national law, this time to show that a remedy other than rescission 
could be granted for mutual mistake and was appropriate under the 
circumstances. 
 As noted in § 152 of the Restatement, where the mistake has a 
material effect on the agreed exchange of performances, the con-
tract is voidable. The availability of water has been held basic to 
the lease or purchase of real property so that when water is not de-
liverable, rescission of the transaction is an available remedy. See, 
e.g., Fowler v. Uezzell, 94 Idaho 951, 500 P.2d 852 (1972) . . .; 
Blythe v. Coney, 228 Ark. 824, 310 S.W.2d 485 (1958) . . . . How-
ever, rescission is not the exclusive remedy for mutual mistake; a 
court may consider other equitable remedies in fashioning a just 
result. Indeed, the avoidance rule of Restatement § 152 expressly 
recognizes that the materiality of the parties’ mistake may be alle-
viated by other equitable relief. Correspondingly, § 158(2) of the 
Restatement acknowledges the power of an equity court to elimi-
nate the effect of mistake by supplying a new term or otherwise 
modifying the agreement as justice requires, thus protecting the 
parties’ reliance interests.51 
 In Renner v. Kehl,52 the Kehls were interested in the large-scale 
commercial cultivation of jojoba. The Renners held leases on 2,262 
acres of unimproved desert land, which appeared to be ideal for the 
Kehls’ purposes. The soil and climate were good, and both parties be-
lieved that sufficient water was available beneath the land to sustain 
jojoba production. 
 In June 1981, the Kehls executed a purchase contract to buy the 
Renners’ leases for $222,200, including $80,200 down. Thereafter, 
the Kehls spent $229,649 to develop the land, part of which went for 
                                                                                                                    
 50. Id. at 1079-80. Section 154 reads as follows:  
A party bears the risk of mistake when 
(a) the risk is allocated to him by agreement of the parties, or  
(b) he is aware, at the time the contract is made, that he has only limited 
knowledge with respect to the facts to which the mistake relates but treats his 
limited knowledge as sufficient, or 
(c) the risk is allocated to him by the court on the ground that it is reasonable 
in the circumstances to do so. 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 154 (1981).  
 51. Thieme, 745 P.2d at 1080. Subsection 158(2) states that “[i]n any case governed by 
the rules stated in this Chapter, if those rules . . . will not avoid injustice, the court may 
grant relief on such terms as justice requires . . . .” RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS 
§ 158(2). 
 52. 722 P.2d 262 (Ariz. 1986). 
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drilling five test water wells. As a result of the drilling, the Kehls de-
termined that the water aquifer underlying the property was inade-
quate for commercial development of jojoba. At this point the project 
was abandoned, and the Kehls sued to rescind the purchase contract.  
 The trial court found that the Kehls were entitled to rescission 
based on mutual mistake. It ordered the Kehls to reassign the lease 
to the Renners, and ordered the Renners to pay the Kehls $309,849, 
consisting of the $80,200 down payment and the $229,649 cost of de-
veloping the property. Thus, Renner, like Thieme, involved both an 
issue of when a contract can be rescinded for mutual mistake and an 
issue of remedy.  
 The Arizona Supreme Court began by invoking national-law rules 
to show that the doctrine of mutual mistake applied: 
 The belief of the parties that adequate water supplies existed 
beneath the property was “a basic assumption on which both par-
ties made the contract,” Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 152 
comment b, and their mutual mistake “ha[d] such a material effect 
on the agreed exchange of performances as to upset the very bases 
of the contract.” Id. comment a. The contract was therefore void-
able and the respondents were entitled to rescission.53 
 The court then modified the remedy granted at trial, again on the 
basis of national-law rules: 
[Although rescission for mutual mistake does not give rise to con-
sequential damages, this does not mean] that the respondents [the 
Kehls] are entitled only to recover their down payment. When a 
party rescinds a contract on the ground of mutual mistake he is 
entitled to restitution for any benefit that he has conferred on the 
other party by way of part performance or reliance. Restatement 
(Second) of Contracts § 376. Restitutionary recoveries are not de-
signed to be compensatory; their justification lies in the avoidance 
of unjust enrichment on the part of the defendant. D. Dobbs, 
Remedies § 4.1 p. 224 (1973). Thus the defendant is generally li-
able for restitution of a benefit that would be unjust for him to 
keep, even though he gained it honestly. Id.; Restatement (Second) 
of Contracts § 376 comment a. The issue we must now address is 
the proper measure of the restitutionary interest. 
 The first step determining the proper measure of restitution re-
quires that the rescinding party return or offer to return, condi-
tional on restitution, any interest in property that he has received 
in the bargain. Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 384(1)(a). In 
Arizona this includes reimbursement for the fair market value of 
the use of the property. . . .  
 However, to avoid unjust enrichment the petitioners must pay 
the respondents a sum equal to the amount by which their prop-
                                                                                                                    
 53. Id. at 265. 
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erty has been enhanced in value by the respondents’ efforts. The 
Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 376 provides that “[i]f [a 
party] has received and must return land . . . he may have made 
improvements on the land in reliance on the contract and he is en-
titled to recover the reasonable value of those improvements. . . . 
The rule stated in this section applies to avoidance on any ground, 
including . . . mistake. . . .” comment a. The reasonable value of 
any improvements is measured by “the extent to which the other 
party’s property has been increased in value or his other interests 
advanced.” Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 371(b). Thus the 
petitioners must pay to the respondents that amount of money 
which represents the enhanced value of the land due to the re-
spondents’ development efforts. In short, the respondents are enti-
tled to their down payment, plus the amount by which their efforts 
increased the value of the petitioners’ property, minus an amount 
which represents the fair rental value of the land during their oc-
cupancy. They are not entitled to the $229,649.84 expended upon 
development, because that would shift the entire risk of mistake 
onto the petitioners, which is incompatible with equitable rescis-
sion.54 
 There are undoubtedly thousands of cases like Thieme and 
Renner, in which all or some significant part of the decision turns on 
the invocation of national-law rules as rules of decision. Of course, 
the majority of cases do not turn on national law. However, my point 
is not to show that national law is the predominant form of law in 
the United States, but only to show that it is a form of law in the 
United States.  
 Not every rule found in the national literature will be viewed by 
the profession as a legal rule. National law consists of rules that are 
generally established in that literature, or are established in one or 
more weighty sources, such as a Restatement, a line of national 
cases, or a treatise that the profession regards as authoritative, and 
not seriously contradicted by others. 
 Sometimes, there may be no clear national-law rule on an issue in 
an area of national law. For example, there are two or even more 
rules in the national literature concerning a landowner’s liability in 
tort to a person injured on his property. However, there also may be 
conflicting rules in local law or federal law. For example, different in-
termediate appellate courts in a given state may formulate different 
rules on when contract damages are sufficiently certain, and differ-
ent federal circuit courts may formulate different rules on whether a 
person who trades on inside information has acted with scienter. 
That does not lead us to say that there is no state or federal law. It is 
true that in these cases there is an official organ, the highest court in 
                                                                                                                    
 54. Id. at 266-67. 
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the relevant jurisdiction, that can resolve the difference between ap-
pellate courts. However, international law may include divergent or 
even contradictory strands, but we do not for that reason say there is 
no international law, even though in that case typically there is no 
official organ that can conclusively resolve such differences. The ab-
sence of a clear national-law rule on a given issue in a national-law 
area is no more embarrassing to the status of national law as law 
than the absence of a clear rule on a given issue is embarrassing to 
the status of state, federal, or international law as law. 
 Furthermore, the extent to which there is discord in national law 
will typically depend on whether the focus is on the core or the pe-
numbra of an area. In most issues in national-law areas, like con-
tracts and torts, the national-law rule is clear, and where there is 
discord it is only at the penumbra. Thus Martin Shapiro, looking at 
tort law from the perspective of a political scientist, drew the conclu-
sion that “[w]hat makes tort so interesting for the study of organiza-
tional policy-making . . . is that there are not fifty-two bodies of tort 
policy but in a very real sense a single body of . . . tort law that runs 
throughout . . . the United States, with local variations to be sure, 
but with a remarkably uniform core.”55 
________________ 
 The characterization of national law as law rests principally on an 
application of the concept of the rule of recognition, mediated 
through the Invocation Principle. This characterization is also sup-
ported, however, by the methodology that Hart employed to justify 
the characterization of international law as law. Hart based that 
characterization on what he called analogies of function and content 
between municipal law (that is, domestic law) and international law. 
 The analogies of function that Hart drew concerned the way in 
which claims under international law are couched: 
[The moral pressure by which social morality is primarily sup-
ported] consists not of appeals to fear or threats of retaliation or 
demands for compensation, but of appeals to conscience, made in 
the expectation that once the person addressed is reminded of the 
moral principle at stake, he may be led by guilt or shame to re-
spect it and make amends. 
 Claims under international law are not couched in such terms 
though of course, as in municipal law, they may be joined with a 
moral appeal. What predominate in the arguments, often techni-
cal, which [nations] address to each other over disputed matters of 
international law, are references to precedents, treaties, and juris-
                                                                                                                    
 55. Martin Shapiro, Decentralized Decision-Making in the Law of Torts, in POLITICAL 
DECISION-MAKING 44, 50 (S. Sidney Ulmer ed., 1970); see also Stephen D. Sugarman, 
Should Congress Engage in Tort Reform?, 1 MICH. L. POL’Y REV. 121, 127 (1996).  
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tic writings; often no mention is made of moral right or wrong, 
good or bad. Hence the claim that the Peking Government has or 
has not a right under international law to expel the Nationalist 
forces from Formosa is very different from the question whether 
this is fair, just, or a morally good or bad thing to do, and is backed 
by characteristically different arguments.56 
The analogies of content “consist in the range of principles, concepts, 
and methods which are common to both municipal and international 
law, and make the lawyers’ technique freely transferable from the 
one to the other. Bentham, the inventor of the expression ‘interna-
tional law’, defended it simply by saying that it was ‘sufficiently 
analogous’ to municipal law.”57 
 Both of these analogies also hold between national law, on the one 
hand, and state and federal law, on the other. As in the case of state 
and federal law, rules of national law are invoked—“couched,” as 
Hart put it—as claims of law, not of morality or policy. And the 
“range of principles, concepts, and methods” in state and federal law, 
on the one hand, and national law, on the other, “make the lawyers’ 
technique freely transferable from the one to the other.” Following 
Hart, therefore, national law is law not only under the concept of the 
rule of recognition, as mediated through the Invocation Principle, but 
also because national law, like international law, is “‘sufficiently 
analogous’” to state and federal law in function and content to have 
the status of law.58 
________________ 
 The argument so far in this section has rested on positive-law 
grounds; that is, on the grounds that national law is law on the basis 
of the concept of the rule of recognition, as mediated by the Invoca-
tion Principle, and also by analogy to state and federal law. However, 
normative reasons also support treating national law as law. 
 First, a major function of law is to allow private actors to engage 
in reliable planning and coordination. National law facilitates those 
functions because it supplements local law, which is often sparse in 
given areas, with a rich network of legal principles and rules that 
lawyers can invoke when local law has not spoken to a given issue.  
                                                                                                                    
 56. HART, supra note 2, at 228. 
 57. Id. at 237. 
 58. I might, but do not, claim that national law is law on analogy to international law. 
I do not make that claim because international law is binding while national law is not. 
That distinction might plausibly be considered sufficient to make such an analogy uncon-
vincing (although I will show in Part III.C. that the fact that a rule is not binding does not 
mean that it is not a legal rule). Therefore, I claim only that the methodology that Hart 
employed to justify the characterization of international law as law also justifies the char-
acterization of national law as law. 
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 Second, national law facilitates the growth of law by providing a 
legal source of legal change. So, for example, when courts began de-
ciding that donative promises were enforceable if relied upon, not-
withstanding existing local-law rules that donative promises were 
unenforceable, they were able to draw on legal rules as well as social 
propositions to support that conclusion. The same thing is true when 
courts began deciding that bargains could be reviewed for uncon-
scionability, notwithstanding local-law rules that bargains are 
enforceable according to their terms without regard to fairness; when 
courts began holding that notwithstanding a local legal-duty rule, a 
modification of a contract in which the only consideration on one side 
is a promise to perform a preexisting duty is enforceable if the modi-
fication is fair and equitable; and so forth. The ability to draw on the 
resources of national law to support changes in local law helps re-
duce the transition costs of change, partly because national law puts 
the profession on notice that the law has already changed. 
C.   A Rule Can Be a Legal Rule Even Though it is Not Binding 
 I characterize national law as law. However, I do not claim that 
the rules of national law are binding. Accordingly, it is implicit in 
this characterization that a rule can be a legal rule even if it is not 
binding. 
 I could argue, in support of this characterization, that many rules 
that are unquestionably legal rules are not binding in any rigorous 
sense of that term. For example, common law rules are not binding 
in any rigorous sense. Presumably, the test for whether a rule is 
binding, under positivism, is the same as the test Raz lays down for 
whether a dispute is “regulated,” namely, that the rule is clear and 
cannot be changed by the court. Presumably too, this test is content-
independent; that is, under this test whether a rule is clear and can-
not be changed by a court depends on the way in which the rule was 
adopted—to put this differently, on the source of the rule—not on the 
content of the rule. In fact, however, very few common law rules sat-
isfy these conditions. 
 To begin with, a court has power to overturn or change any com-
mon law rule. Of course, this power is subject to explicit or implicit 
institutional principles concerning when overturning or change is 
proper, but the application of those principles is almost entirely 
based on the content of the rule. If a common law rule is substan-
tially congruent with the rule that would be best as a matter of social 
morality, social policy, and experience (hereafter, “social proposi-
tions”), the rule should be retained and applied even if it is not the 
best rule, because the social value of stability of doctrine will out-
weigh the slight social gain from changing or overturning the rule. 
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On the other hand, if a common law rule is substantially incongruent 
with social propositions, the significant social gain from overturning 
or changing the rule will outweigh the value of stability of doctrine, 
and the court should overturn or change the rule. 
 It is true that pure overruling does not frequently occur, but nei-
ther is it uncommon, and in any event the point here is not an issue 
of frequency. Rather, the point is that any common law rule can be 
overturned or changed if it is substantially incongruent with social 
propositions. Furthermore, although pure overruling is not frequent, 
other methods of overturning and changing common law rules are 
common. For example, a court can properly interpret precedents in 
two very different ways: by emphasizing what the precedents said or 
what the precedents did. Accordingly, a court can properly transform 
a rule established in the precedents, without formal overruling, by 
“reinterpreting” the precedents on the basis of their facts. This 
method was utilized, for example, in MacPherson v. Buick Motor 
Co.59 There Cardozo transformed a previously well-settled rule, that 
a manufacturer who was negligent in producing a product was liable 
only to the immediate buyer unless the product was of a type that 
was “imminently” or “inherently” dangerous, into a straightforward 
negligence rule, under which a negligent manufacturer was liable to 
any person who would be foreseeably injured as a result of the negli-
gence. Like overruling, the method of transformation is wholly con-
tent-dependent; it will be employed only when the rule stated by the 
precedents is substantially incongruent with social propositions. 
 Using an even more common process, a court can properly change 
a rule by modifying the rule through the process of distinguishing the 
precedents in which the rule is stated. The institutional principles 
that govern this process are also content-dependant: where a rule is 
substantially incongruent with social propositions, the courts prop-
erly can and often will modify the rule by adopting an exception that 
is inconsistent with the basic rule. 
 In short, courts have both formal and substantive power to not 
apply the common law rules they have made, because instead of ap-
plying the rule the court can change or overturn it by such processes 
as overruling, transformation, or modification through distinction or 
interpretation. Furthermore, the institutional principles that deter-
mine when it is appropriate to change or overturn a common law rule 
through any of these processes are content-dependent, that is, they 
depend wholly or almost wholly on the extent to which the rule is 
congruent with social morality, social policy, and experience.  
                                                                                                                    
 59. 111 N.E. 1050 (N.Y. 1916). 
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 I have discussed these and cognate issues at length in The Nature 
of the Common Law,60 and therefore will not elaborate them here. 
For present purposes, the basic point is that in the United States a 
court that makes a common law rule is not bound by the rule in any 
rigorous sense of that term, because the court is not required to apply 
the rule unless the content of the rule is substantially congruent with 
social propositions.61 Accordingly, if rules are legal rules only if they 
are binding in the sense that that they are clear and cannot be 
changed by the courts, very few common law rules would qualify as 
legal rules. 
 Nevertheless, I will not rest the thesis that a nonbinding rule can 
be a legal rule on the proposition that in the United States common 
law rules are not in any rigorous sense binding on the courts that 
make them, because common law rules are binding in two weak 
senses.  
 First, common law rules are binding in the weak sense that a 
court that does not follow a common law rule that it made is subject 
to criticism unless the rule is substantially incongruent with moral-
ity, policy, and experience. This kind of criticism differs from the 
kind of criticism that can be made of a court that does not follow na-
tional law. 
 Second, common law rules that are made by superior courts are 
typically binding on inferior courts. This sense of binding is also 
weak, partly because it depends on the existence of inferior courts, 
partly because even inferior courts can and do have power to change 
a rule by the process of distinguishing, and partly because even if a 
common law rule is binding on an inferior court it is not binding in 
any rigorous sense on a litigant, who can appeal from the inferior 
court to a court that does have power to change or overturn the rule.
 Accordingly, at least for present purposes I will accept that a 
common law rule is binding in a weak sense and that national law is 
not binding even in a weak sense. Therefore, my argument in sup-
port of the claim that a rule can be a legal rule even though it is not 
binding rests on two different bases. 
 To begin with, considering the very weak nature of the meaning of 
binding in the common law, any concept of law that turned to a sig-
nificant extent on whether a rule was binding would swing on a very 
weak hinge. 
                                                                                                                    
 60. EISENBERG, supra note 37. 
 61. Much the same holds true of rules that consist of statutory or constitutional inter-
pretations; that is, although the courts cannot change or overturn a constitutional or statu-
tory text, they can change or overturn the interpretation of such a text in earlier prece-
dents. For economy of exposition, I will not discuss this issue separately. 
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 Next, if the rule of recognition is taken as a postulate, and if it is 
accepted that a secondary rule is a rule of recognition if it is viewed 
that way by the profession, then we must follow the views of the pro-
fession wherever they lead us, rather than laying down a priori con-
ditions—such as whether a primary rule is binding—as to what rules 
of recognition the profession may adopt. Accordingly, any class of 
primary rules, including rules that are not binding, are legal rules if 
they constitute legal rules under whatever criteria are contained in a 
secondary rule that is viewed by the profession as a rule of recogni-
tion. A claim that a primary rule must be binding if it is to be a legal 
rule is therefore inconsistent with the concept of the rule of recogni-
tion, which includes no such a priori requirement. (This point holds 
even if a rule of recognition must be accepted by judges and other of-
ficials, rather than the legal profession.) 
 A strong example of this point—stronger even than national law, 
because much more widespread—is the position of judicial opinions 
in civil law. In civil-law systems, it is almost invariably a rule, either 
explicit or implicit, that the rules in a judicial opinion are not bind-
ing. However, in most civil-law systems the rules established in judi-
cial opinions count as law in almost the same way that such rules 
count as law in common law countries.  
 Under German law, for example, precedents other than those of 
the Federal Constitutional Court are not binding.62 Nevertheless, 
precedents play a vital role in German law. For example, Alexy and 
Dreier report that precedents are cited in ninety-five percent or more 
of cases in the highest courts.63 Moreover, they point out, “[t]he fact 
that following . . . precedent usually is not combined with [argument 
based on substantive considerations other than the precedent] shows 
that precedents have a force of their own. This is underscored by the 
fact that a lawyer neglecting precedents of higher courts may be li-
able in damages to his clients.”64 
 Reinhard Zimmerman elaborates the role of judicial opinions in 
German law as follows: 
 [The Civil Code] is today enveloped by thick layers of case law 
which anybody who wishes to apply the law has to be thoroughly 
familiar with. Drafting mistakes and internal inconsistencies were 
discovered in the code. . . . Entirely new and unforeseen legal prob-
lems had to be solved: What are the legal consequences of artificial 
insemination? Can the birth of a child conceivably be regarded as a 
damaging event? . . . Changed societal mores and evaluations had 
                                                                                                                    
 62. See, e.g., Robert Alexy & Ralf Dreier, Precedent in the Federal Republic of Ger-
many, in INTERPRETING PRECEDENTS: A COMPARATIVE STUDY 17, 26-27, 32 (D. Neil Mac-
Cormick & Robert S. Summers eds., 1997). 
 63. Id. at 23. 
 64. Id. at 31 (citation omitted). 
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to be accommodated. . . . Unjustified enrichment, delictual liabil-
ity, the law of damages: areas such as these, where the code only 
provides some general principles, have become pockets of a typical 
case-law jurisprudence. 
 But the courts have done much more. They have introduced 
entirely new legal institutions of which we find, at best, one or 
two scattered points of departure, sometimes not even the 
faintest hint, in the code. The German equivalent of frustration 
of contract . . . was formulated, initially, in response to the 
problems posed by the consequences of the First World War on 
the performance of long-term contracts and has become an es-
tablished feature of the German legal landscape, even though 
the draftsmen of the code had rejected its predecessor of the 
pre-code ius commune period . . . . 
 Culpa in contrahendo [has been installed] in the grey area be-
tween contract and delict, and positive malperformance has been 
introduced as a specific type of breach of contract, supplementing 
the (rather awkward) system of remedies provided by the code. Of-
ten these new institutions have been designed to circumvent cer-
tain provisions of the code which have turned out to be inappropri-
ate or inconvenient. . . .  
 The famous “general clauses” . . . of the [Civil Code] have of 
course, provided the most convenient space for judicial law-
making. In the process however, they have been taken far beyond 
the scope of application originally allotted to them. The standard of 
‘good faith,’ for instance, appears only in a seemingly rather mar-
ginal provision (§ 242), where it relates specifically to the manner 
in which an obligation has to be performed. Soon, however, the 
courts seized upon the rule and converted it into a provision gov-
erning, and transforming, the whole of the German law of contract 
. . . .65  
 Thus it is impossible to understand German law without taking 
account of rules set out in judicial opinions, despite the fact that 
those rules are not binding. Generally speaking, that is also true of 
other civil law jurisdictions. As summarized by Martijn Hesselink: 
[I]n the course of the last century it became . . . obvious that courts 
effectively do and must create new laws. Thus it became normal to 
speak of a change in the courts’ direction or policy . . . and courts 
do now frequently formulate general rules or principles . . . . More-
over, it is now widely accepted that la jurisprudence should be re-
garded as a source of law (sometimes in less straightforward lan-
guage referred to as “unwritten law”, as opposed to the written law 
in the codes, which is “found” by the courts). Finally, in most 
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European countries we now speak openly of our (highest) courts’ 
task as a creator of law . . . .66  
 There are many nuances (in part made necessary by the rule that 
precedents are not binding in the civil law), but the main, and fairly 
limited, functional difference between the rules established in judi-
cial opinions in common law and civil law countries is that when 
common law rules are formally overturned they are said to be over-
ruled, while when civil law rules are overturned they are not said to 
be overruled; that it may be somewhat easier to overturn civil law 
rules than it is to overturn common law rules; and that there may be 
no no need to distinguish cases in the civil law. These differences are 
simply not enough to be significant in the concept of what constitutes 
law.  
 The actual working of the common law in the United States shows 
that any concept of law that made the definition of law turn in part 
on bindingness would swing on a very weak hinge. The actual work-
ing of the civil law takes us a step further. The massive amount of 
law found in the judicial opinions in civilian jurisdictions shows that 
any concept of law that turns in part on bindingness completely lacks 
explanatory power and an empirical foundation. In short, if we seek a 
concept of law that is based on actual practices and conventions, 
rather than on a priori convictions, then both common law and civil-
ian legal systems show that a rule may be a legal rule even though it 
is not binding. 
D.   In the United States, Law is Made Not Only by Judges and Other 
Officials of the Deciding Jurisdiction, but Also by the National 
Judiciary, Legal Scholars, and Professional Institutions 
 Another implication of the concept of national law is that in the 
United States law is made not only by judges and other officials of a 
deciding jurisdiction, but also by the national judiciary, legal schol-
ars, and professional institutions (in particular, the American Law 
Institute). Some stands of positivism explicitly or implicitly posit a 
very restricted set of lawmaking participants, that is, judges and 
other officials of a deciding jurisdiction. However, just as the content 
of the rule of recognition in the United States depends on the views 
of the legal profession, not simply on the views of judges and other of-
ficials, so too does the legal profession, not simply judges and other 
officials, participate in lawmaking. Law in the United States is not 
just an entity that is handed down by officials. Rather, it is a product 
of an ongoing conversation within the profession—between judges in 
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all jurisdictions, between scholars, within professional institutions, 
and among all these groups. 
CONCLUSION 
 There is a body of national law. It is made, not by officials of a de-
ciding jurisdiction acting in that capacity, but by the legal profession, 
including the national judiciary, legal scholars, and professional in-
stitutions, principally the American Law Institute. If the concept of 
the rule of recognition is taken as a postulate, national law is law pri-
marily because the rules of national law are invoked by the legal 
profession, including the judiciary, as legal rules of decision. Follow-
ing Hart’s methodology, national law is also law by analogy to state 
and federal law. 
 The concept of national law is significant for several reasons.  
 First, it is important to understand the tools utilized in the prac-
tice of law, in the teaching of law, in legal scholarship, and in judicial 
decisionmaking, and national law is one such tool. Because national 
law is law, American legal scholars can meaningfully write about and 
teach national law, and the American Law Institute can meaning-
fully help make law. Because law students are educated in national 
law, practicing lawyers and judges will have internalized both the 
substantive rules of national law that they learned in law school and 
the institutional principle that rules established in national litera-
ture are law.  
 Next, it is important to understand the techniques by which uni-
formity in law can be achieved, and national law is one such tech-
nique.  
 Finally, national law exemplifies four important principles con-
cerning the meaning, application, and scope of the concept of law: (1) 
The social group that must accept a secondary rule for the rule to 
constitute a rule of recognition is the legal profession, rather than 
simply judges and other officials. (2) Whether the legal profession ac-
cepts a secondary rule as a rule of recognition can be determined by 
examining the kinds of primary rules that are invoked by the profes-
sion as legal rules in resolving legal issues in general, and deciding 
cases in particular. (3) A rule can be a legal rule even though it is not 
binding. (4) In the United States, law is made not only by judges and 
other officials of the deciding jurisdiction but also by the national ju-
diciary, legal scholars, and professional institutions. 
